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I
INTRODUCTION

The relationship between federal bankruptcy and consumer credit is
controversial and unsettled, owing to a clash of diametric views as to when
individuals should be allowed to avoid obligations to pay their debts. The
result is a complex, compromissary structure of uncertain content and
variable application, one aspect of which-a general concept of "bankruptcy
abuse"-relates to bankruptcy planning and the selection among bankruptcy
options by individual debtors. Although the rules that govern such abuse
should reflect coherent policy judgments, often they do not because
connections among the various underlying substantive issues are
unrecognized or ignored.
Consumer bankruptcy law relating to the discharge of debts is similar to
contract doctrines of impossibility, cure, and insecurity, each of which
expressly defines legally acceptable options that permit less than complete
contract performance under specified circumstances. So, too, in bankruptcy,
incomplete performance-the nonpayment of debt-may be legally
sanctioned, absent a finding that the process has been abused. Abuse may be
found in the debtor's motivations for filing, in the manner in which he has
dealt with his creditors and assets prior to filing, or in a demonstrated lack of
need for bankruptcy relief.
II
DEFINING THE DISPUTE

The interface of bankruptcy law with nonbankruptcy law and practice' is
marked with conflict, and resolution of that conflict requires a measure of
perhaps uneasy accommodation on one side or both.2 For example, the
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bankruptcy notion that under at least some circumstances a debtor should be
relieved of his obligation to pay his debts collides with the more general
expectation that he will pay them.3 The tensions created by efforts to
reconcile these antithetical propositions in the consumer credit context are
reflected in the definition of consumer bankruptcy abuse.
Most consumer bankruptcies are initiated by the debtor, who has chosen
this course from among several available options, including voluntary
repayment, refinancing, absconding, and ignoring creditor pressure. His
choice may have been rational, planned, and fully informed, or it may have
been emotional, unstudied, and uneconomic. Historically, however, this
unilateral decision by the debtor has been permitted to define the role of
bankruptcy in the consumer credit context, and standards of abuse have
performed only a limited monitoring function in narrowly circumscribed
kinds of cases.
This "natural state" definition of the role of consumer bankruptcy has
been accepted for many years. Indeed, prior to 1984, most reforms in the
area were directed at expanding the debtor's protection against oppressive
debt-collection practices and increasing his retained property potential rather
than at constraining his choice of an insolvency remedy. After passage of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978, however, the dramatic increase in the rate of
individual bankruptcy filings was widely ascribed, at least in part, to its overly
attractive debtor benefits. This perception animated many of the consumer
4
bankruptcy reforms introduced into the Code by the 1984 amendments.
§ 522(b)(1). As a result, a substantial majority of all states were moved to reexamine and modernize
their exemption laws, and many simultaneously "opted out" of the federal alternative exemptions. 1
W. NORTON, BANKRUvrcy LAw AND PRACTICE §§ 26.06-26.10 (1986). Although in many cases these
state exemptions differ markedly from the federal exemptions, they do at least reflect a contemporary
reconsideration of the underlying policy issues. See generally Woodward, Exemptions, Opting Out, and
Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 335 (1982).
Federal bankruptcy rules paralleled and, in fact, led nonbankruptcy developments regarding the
"blanket" security interest involving consumer goods. A blanket security interest in consumer goods
encompasses all of the debtor's property even though the loan that it secures did not finance the
purchase of the covered items. To the extent that the interest extends to household goods, it is
reasonable to believe that it has been designed merely to establish undue leverage over the consumer
without any intent by the creditor to foreclose in the event of default. Initially, in the 1960's, the
Uniform Commercial Code established limits on the ability of a creditor to encumber after-acquired
consumer property. U.C.C. § 9-204(2) (1977). Subsequently, in 1978, the consumer debtor was
empowered to avoid such security interests in bankruptcy to the extent that they impaired his
exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982). This protection was then expanded in 1985 by a Federal
Trade Commission Rule which provided that a blanket security interest created by a consumer credit
agreement constitutes an unfair practice. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (1986).
In contrast, the Bankruptcy Code incorporates provisions that separate a creditor's right to a
deficiency claim from the leverage based on his claim to collateral. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 722 (1982); but
FTC proposals that would have reduced the creditor's right to pursue a deficiency outside of
bankruptcy were not adopted. See 16 C.F.R. § 444 (1986).
3. Compare Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J.
1261 (1980), with Schwartz, The Casefor Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979), and Kronman,
Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978).

4. See Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.: An Alternative Approach, 71 GEO. L.J.
1129, 1129-31 (1983).
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These reforms sought to reduce incentives for inappropriate bankruptcy
filings and to discourage otherwise objectionable behavior by individual
debtors. The difficulty has been, however, not only that we know little about
how or why such a debtor makes his decision concerning bankruptcy, but also
that we do not even necessarily agree as to what his decision in any particular
case should be. This confusion is reflected in the law's current attempts to
both encourage and deter voluntary use of bankruptcy by consumer debtorsa classic illustration of policy compromise without reconciliation.
Furthermore, a lingering suspicion exists that neither desired effect routinely
filters through to actual decisions by actual individual debtors facing what
they define as a "need" for bankruptcy.
The law of consumer bankruptcy abuse thus operates in a doubly-blind
situation. First, hunches are substituted for data on the nonperformance of
consumer credit contracts. In place of data, slogans document abuse.
Doctrinaire assumption is injected in place of understanding. One common
assumption, echoing economics theory, is that consumers who are under debt
pressure and who lack legal advice nevertheless rely upon an informed,
rationally measured balancing of costs and benefits when deciding whether to
perform under their credit contracts. This view contradicts both normal
experience and the assumptions on which most consumer credit regulation is
based. But alternative models that have been propounded are even less clear
and provide even less explicit guidance as to the mechanics of consumer
5
behavior.
There is, moreover, only minimal agreement about what consumer debtor
behavior is abusive. This becomes clear both in considering the relationship
between a debtor's income and the propriety of his discharge in bankruptcy
and in determining the extent to which debtors legitimately can plan to
optimize bankruptcy effects. 6 Consensus on policy is confined to the
periphery. Abjectly poor, harassed debtors forced into poverty by
uncontrolled circumstances clearly should qualify for bankruptcy relief.
Persons with high incomes and few debts who deliberately transfer and hide
assets to maximize the property they retain should not qualify for such relief.
Between these extremes, however, there are sharp unresolved disagreements
as to when consumer bankruptcy should be sanctioned.
Bankruptcy doctrine does not generally address these anomalies, but
rather relies on the decisions of individual debtors to define the role of
bankruptcy in their own particular cases. Abuse law, however, represents the
5. See LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis.
L. REV. 311; Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite--The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970).
See also Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20
(1969); Note, Business as Usual: An Empirical Study of Automobile Deficiency Judgment Suits in the District of
Columbia, 3 CONN. L. REV. 511 (1971). For a brief discussion of secured lender leverage efforts, see 1
P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 1.04(3) (1986).
6. See Vukowich, supra note 4, at 1130-31; Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protectionfor Consumers: A
Response, 72 GEo. LJ. 1333 (1984); Vukowich, A Reply to Professor Warren, 72 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1364-65
(1984).
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exception: It is defined by standards couched in terms of excess and of broad
norms of fair dealing that focus on income-shifting, transfer of assets, and
fraudulent prepetition conduct.
III
SECTION 707(B):

ABUSE OF CHAPTER

7

RELIEF

Only one section of the Bankruptcy Code expressly refers to "abuse" by
an individual debtor. Notwithstanding a presumption in favor of the relief
requested by the debtor, section 707(b) provides that the court may dismiss a
chapter 7 liquidation case if granting the debtor a discharge would be a
"substantial abuse of the provisions" of that chapter. 7 Exercise of this judicial
power is limited to cases involving individuals whose debts are primarily
consumer debts."
Section 707(b) thus introduces judicial authority to review the propriety of
a chapter 7 proceeding and imposes direct restraints on the debtor's ability to
obtain bankruptcy relief. Section 707(b) provides that dismissal must be on
the court's own motion, thus recognizing a public interest in preventing
bankruptcy abuse and authorizing an independent judicial monitoring
function not limited to the court's traditional role of responding to motions
and complaints.
The statute, however, supplies no substantial guidance to a court seeking
to determine if a bankruptcy filing impermissibly deviates from acceptable
social policy standards. Because the court is not acting on a motion by a party
in interest, dismissal must be based not on proven or provable harm to a
particular creditor, but rather on actions or circumstances that bear more
broadly on the role of bankruptcy in the consumer credit context.
The lack of articulated standards and the unique, self-actuating method of
raising the issue of dismissal sanctioned by section 707(b) creates a serious
policy risk. Because the role of bankruptcy in this context has largely been
defined by ad hoc, personal decisions of individual debtors and because these
decisions will likely be restrained by similarly ad hoc and personal decisions of
bankruptcy court judges, both sets of decisions may be based on no more than
subjective prudential notions concerning the relationship between bankruptcy
discharge and the moral obligation to pay debts. The existence of this risk
counsels against aggressive, pro-active judicial monitoring and in favor of
judicial circumspection in acting under section 707(b). In general, then, as
discussed below, dismissal of a consumer bankruptcy petition should be
restricted to cases involving either (1) an existing statutory basis on which
discharge of all debts could have been denied if a creditor had raised.the
issue; or (2) a provable ability to pay substantially all debts out of the debtor's
current income if there were no liquidation.
7.

11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. III 1985).

8.

Id.
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Abuse and Public Interest

Although a chapter 7 proceeding ordinarily discharges all debts, section
727 lists several events that will support the denial of the discharge of any
claims. 9 These objections to discharge focus on actions by a debtor that
adversely affect all creditors or the integrity of the bankruptcy process, and
they must be expressly raised by a party in interest. Because in many
consumer cases the likely economic return supplies inadequate incentive for
creditors to involve themselves or even participate in the proceedings, section
727 objections are seldom filed. Nevertheless, the factual bases on which a
discharge could have been denied under section 727 are probably cognizable
as "substantial abuse" under section 707(b).
Thus, it should be a bankruptcy abuse for a debtor to obtain a discharge if
a valid objection could have been-but was not-raised by a creditor. The
section 727 objections properly lie if the debtor has made fraudulent
conveyances before filing, failed to account for lost assets, or failed to comply
with important obligations imposed upon him in chapter 7. These acts not
only prejudice creditors, but also compromise the integrity of the bankruptcy
itself. Creditor inaction does not suspend the public interest in denying a
discharge to the debtor in such cases.
In contrast, "substantial abuse" should not incorporate the provisions of
section 523, which excepts from discharge particular debts owing to their
distinctive character or the manner in which they were incurred. Some of
these exceptions relate to acts to defraud particular creditors or to the fact
that the debt was incurred through willful and malicious injury of another.' 0
Section 523 also excepts such debts as taxes and support and alimony claims.
Only the interest of the individual creditor involved is at stake under section
523, and it is properly incumbent on him to protect his own interest. Where,
of course, a general pattern of fraudulently incurred debts emerges shortly
before bankruptcy, the situation may be different. Absent such a pattern,
however, section 523 reflects a policy of protecting only the affected individual
creditor, and courts should not read this policy into section 707(b) to deny a
debtor a discharge of all of his debts.
Section 707(b) also provides the court with a method to monitor a debtor's
good faith efforts to comply with reporting and other obligations imposed on
a debtor in bankruptcy. The result of such monitoring was illustrated in In re
Bryant," where the court, emphasizing the equitable nature of bankruptcy
relief, dismissed a chapter 7 petition under section 707(b). It rested its
finding of substantial abuse on two factors. First, there were indications that
the debtor could pay as much as two-thirds of his existing debts from income
if he adjusted an extravagant lifestyle that, in light of his assets, the court
regarded as inconsistent with a need for bankruptcy relief. And second, the
9.
10.
11.

11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982). See 1 W. NORTON, supra note 2, at §§ 27.14-27.25.
11 U.S.C. § 523 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
47 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
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court observed that the debtor had not complied with reporting obligations,
but rather had concealed debts and assets while inflating expense estimates:
[T]he Court finds on the part of the Debtor an utter disregard of his duties under the
... Code to truthfully list all of his obligations, his monthly expenses, and to disclose
his general financial postion to the Court . .
. Such selective disclosures and
recollections act as a fraud upon the Court ....
As such the Court will not tolerate
them while at the same time shielding the Debtor from those whom he rightfully
12
owes.

B.

Abuse and Ability to Pay

Section 707(b) permits the court to consider whether the debtor's income
establishes a need for bankruptcy relief. It is an abuse to file under chapter 7 if
current and foreseeable future income as measured against reasonable
expenses is substantially sufficient to pay existing debts. This standard, which
is central to section 707(b), stems from legislative proposals that would have
required that the debtor pay all "affordable" debt from his income. Although
these proposals were rejected, section 707(b), along with a new requirement
that the debtor file a statement of earnings and current expenses,' 3 provides
for a more limited review of the relationship between the debtor's income and
his debts that is designed to prevent his discharge in liquidation in the face of
high disposable income.
The original proposals that evolved into section 707(b) contemplated
quite dramatic changes in the role of chapter 7 in the consumer credit
context. A credit industry proposal would have limited consumer bankruptcy
to income-based proceedings if the debtor could pay a "reasonable portion of
his debts out of anticipated future income" that was "not needed ... for the
support of himself and his dependents."' 4 An alternative, supported by an
American Bar Association committee, would have given creditors a right to
request judicial review of the debtor's income and payment capability and
would have empowered the court to dismiss the petition if the debtor was
capable of paying a reasonable amount of his debt.' 5 The ABA Committee
proposed that chapter 7 relief not be "something which should be available
for the asking... [but rather that it be] a form of equitable relief which should
be justified by the exigencies of the consumer's financial condition."' 6 But
section 707(b) inverts the presumption and softens the standard: Chapter 7
relief is available unless a court denies access based on available income for the
payment of debts.
These restrictive proposals were based on a belief that consumer use of
bankruptcy was becoming uncontrolled. The underlying policy judgment was
that bankruptcy liquidation is appropriate only in cases where there is a
12. Id. at 25.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. III 1985).
14. Proposed Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1981, S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG.
REC. 32,195 (1981).
15. Report and Recommendations: Consumer Bankruptcy Subcommittee of the Committee on Consumer
FinancialServices of the American Bar Association, 2 N. ILL. L. REV. 239, 259-61 (1982).
16. Id. at 259.

Page 89: Spring 1987]

CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

ABUSE

general inability to pay debts. The underlying assumption was that the
debtor's decision should be based solely on whether he could pay his debts,
with bankruptcy serving as a back-up, secondary option to be invoked only
when the debtor's financial predicament would be otherwise unmanageable.
The policy issue thus related to the reasons for and timing of the debtor's
decision to file bankruptcy rather than pay his debts. Leaving this decision to
unfettered consumer choice effectively created a "natural state" definition of
the role of bankruptcy that equated practice with acceptable policy. A
"natural state" policy assumes that social, economic, and interpersonal
influences adequately shape consumer decisions to conform to a desired
model that in most cases limits bankruptcy to persons in serious economic
distress. But the credit industry argued, based on the large increase in
bankruptcy filings, that legal and environmental changes had altered the
"natural state" model. Among these allegedly influential changes were more
liberal discharge benefits, increased property protections, and shifting social
perceptions that reduced the stigma of a bankruptcy filing. In short, these
changes created a sense that the overall benefits under the system were now
too favorable to the debtor. Industry representatives alleged that as a result,
liquidation too often became a primary option, selected readily by the debtor
without sufficient effort having been made to pay.' 7 This conclusion was
based on assumptions about the behavior of consumer debtors for which the
only supporting empirical data were supplied by a questionable study of
bankrupt debtors. 18
Most of us would agree that bankruptcy discharge is neither necessary nor
especially desirable for debtors who are able to pay and are under no great
countervailing pressure. This general agreement, however, masks significant
disputes that surround what constitutes ability to pay, how it should be
measured, what burdens a debtor should be required to accept, and whether
statutory standards to regulate access to liquidation and discharge are
justified by prevailing levels of abuse. ' The credit industry proposed that
liquidation should be available only in the worst cases of financial distress and
defined "worst case" as an inability to pay even a reasonable portion of
existing debts from income. Liquidation discharge under this formulation
would be reserved for cases of virtually total income failure and would be
calibrated to a defined inability to pay determined by a court rather than by the
debtor.
Traditionally, in a liquidation case, the debtor's income potential has been
ignored, and a creditor's right to payment has been measured in terms of the
debtor's current assets. The credit industry's proposals, however, looked to
the debtor's income as the crucial determinant of both his right to file and his
17.
18.

See Vukowich, supra note 4.
See 1 CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER,

UNIVERSITY, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY

KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT,

PURDUE

ii (1982) (research commissioned by credit industry). See

also Warren, supra note 6, at 1338-39 (criticizing study commissioned by credit industry).
19. See Warren, supra note 6, at 1338-39; Vukowich, supra note 6, at 1362-63.
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creditors' right to payment. One supporter suggested: "Repayment plans
that draw upon future earnings more accurately reflect a debtor's ability to
pay than do liquidation plans. We live to a great extent in a cash flow
world." 2 0 From this perspective, then, a chapter 7 filing should be based on
income failure alone; a liquidation filing on any other basis would constitute
an abuse if the debtor's future income could, nonetheless, provide substantial
recovery for his creditors.
The income model reflects the view that creditors should have access to the
debtor's future income and that liquidation bankruptcy unfairly deprives them
of access to this resource. In a liquidation proceeding, a creditor's recovery is
converted from an expectancy of payment out of the debtor's income to
payment from his fixed, existing assets. If future income is an asset or
valuable expectancy, liquidation shields this asset from creditor claims and
converts it fully to the debtor's personal use. Fulfillment of the expectancy of
payment, however, requires voluntary action by the debtor, while the
proposed bankruptcy model would compel payments in return for discharge.
Some shifting of income assets away from creditors in a liquidation is
justified on policy grounds, and this is anticipated in a liquidation system even
under the rejected credit industry proposals. Future income supports the
fresh economic start for the debtor. Consequently, if the income is marginal,
equitable considerations and economic reality justify denying creditors access
to it and reserving it instead to the debtor. Indeed, the bankruptcy goal of
facilitating a fresh state for the debtor ordinarily incorporates at least some
flexibility in income control.
Some debtors, however, have high disposable income but few tangible,
nonexempt assets. A liquidation discharge absolves such debtors of liability
to creditors who may have received little or no payment but leaves these
debtors with substantial future income to which their creditors will be denied
access. This sequence of effects forms the primary model underlying the
drive for reform. How often such high-income filings occur is not known.
Under a "natural state" model, however, bankruptcy law historically has
permitted high-income liquidation, the debtor being restrained only by social
considerations and his judgment about whether the benefits justify
relinquishing his current assets and damaging his credit standing.
Outside of bankruptcy, the relationship between income and debt
collection involves voluntary payments, most often animated by a moral
obligation to pay. Because voluntary payments are common, decisions to
extend credit are frequently based not on the debtor's assets, but rather on
his projected income. A bankruptcy liquidation sharply changes the focus to
tangible, current assets. "The rights of unsecured creditors, who may lend at
least in part on an expected flow basis, and the debtor, who borrows on the

20.

See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 980.
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same basis, suddenly are determined solely by the value placed on the
21
debtor's nonexempt assets on the date of bankruptcy."
Voluntary payment, however, does not completely define a system of
legally protected creditor reliance on the debtor's income. The judicial
collection system emphasizes levy and execution against nonexempt assets.
And wage garnishment is controversial and restricted by law, 22 ordinarily
available-even where it is sanctioned-only if the creditor first has exhausted
his remedies against the debtor's other assets. Moreover, as illustrated by
recent FTC rules limiting contract wage assignments, the national pattern is
moving away from coercive access to wages for debt collection. 23 The
debtor's income is not the primary element in the legal collection system, and
it should not be the primary element in the bankruptcy discharge system.
The fact that mandatory income proposals were rejected in drafting the
Bankruptcy Code bears on the proper interpretation of "substantial abuse" in
section 707(b). Congress did not confine bankruptcy liquidations to cases in
which the debtor was unable to pay from income. Instead, the new law
deviates only slightly from a "natural state" model, with primary discretion
concerning the initiation of proceedings remaining in the debtor. Judicial
restraints affect only cases of substantial abuse.
Such abuse may occur when there is a shifting of income that is patently
not required by the debtor's reasonable financial needs. The Code adopts a
discretionary review standard to curtail cases of egregious abuse without
converting consumer bankruptcy entirely into a wage-based remedy. This
solution limits dismissals to cases in which the debtor has the demonstrable
ability to pay substantially all of his debts within a reasonable time. Tests
satisfiable by a lesser ability to pay would reinstate the rejected mandatory
income proposals.
A standard of substantiality must consider not only the debtor's income,
but also the liabilities and ordinary expenses that must be offset against that
income. Section 707(b) poses an equity test in which motivations are
important. Accordingly, a bankrupt debtor may reasonably be required to
demonstrate some sacrifice or a genuine effort to deal fairly with his creditors
as a precondition to obtaining a discharge. It is not appropriate, however, for
a court to hold the debtor to its own assessment of the minimum support
needs for him and his dependents and to calibrate this imposed level to bare
subsistence-although this control on the court does not suggest that a court
must uncritically accept the debtor's projections as the sole determinant of
what funds are left to pay his creditors.

21. Id. at 981.
22. See Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1982). See also CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 704.070 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 5205(d), 5231 (McKinney 1978 &
Supp. 1986); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 63.004 (Vernon 1986).

23.

See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (1986).
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The reported cases under section 707(b) reflect judicial efforts to effect a
fair balance. For example, in In re Grant2 4 a debtor earning $65,000 a year
originally reported monthly expenses estimates for a family of four of $4,806.
These estimates were later reduced to $3,333, but they were still described by
the court as inflated and excessive since they included almost $900 for two
cars, $450 for entertainment, and $550 for clothes. The court dismissed the
case because it found no sudden hardship causing financial distress, a lack of
sincere effort by the debtor to tighten his financial belt, and an actual ability to
pay over sixty percent of his unsecured debt over a five-year period. Failure
of the debtor to propose a reasonable family budget was held to indicate bad
faith.
In In re Mastroeni 25 the debtor had an annual income of $73,000 and
unsecured debt of $110,000, largely accumulated from failed speculative
investments. His statement of expenses reported a monthly net income of
$4,000 and expenses of $3,980, including almost $900 for entertainment and
recreation, coupled with $600 for "supplies." The court noted that the
debtor's monthly expenses were obviously inflated. Borrowing language
from In re Bryant, the court noted that "even if these amounts are accurate, the
Court has serious questions about their appropriateness" for a debtor in
chapter 7. Bankruptcy liquidation is not designed "to allow the Debtor to
lead the life of Riley while his creditors suffer .... 26
Similarly, in In re Bryant 2 7 the court's dismissal of a case under section
707(b) was bolstered by a finding that with a modicum of restraint, the debtor
could have paid more than sixty-seven percent of his liabilities over three
years from an annual income of in excess of $40,000 for a family of four. The
court questioned the accuracy of some elements of a monthly expenses
estimate of $3,500 that would have consumed the debtor's entire net income
but went on to suggest that even if they were accurate, the submitted
estimated expenses for two late model cars, cable television, and
entertainment reflected a lifestyle inconsistent with the debtor's asserted need
for chapter 7 relief.
The implicit financial model in cases such as Bryant posits relative frugality,
if not abstinence, as a precondition to chapter 7 bankruptcy. This approach
was amplified in In re Hudson,28 in which the court commented that chapter 7
provides "relief to a debtor when he finds himself in financial circumstances
which threaten his immediate well-being." In Hudson relief was granted on
the basis of a general standard that requires dismissal if the debtor has a
capability to pay a "substantial portion" of his debts. Other courts refer to
"meaningful" payment. But the label is immaterial. The core consideration
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

51
56
Id.
47
56

Bankr. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
Bankr. 456 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
at 458.
Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
Bankr. 415 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
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involves the degree of self-denial sacrifice expected of a chapter 7 debtor who
has an expectation of income.
The abuse issue arises only if the court decides to raise it,29 and opinions
are reported only if the court decides to publish them. Although many such
reported opinions construe section 707(b) to require close scrutiny of the
debtor's affairs and a consequent finding that he will otherwise suffer
substantial financial hardship before he may qualify for bankruptcy relief, this
view does not command universal judicial support. In In re Mastroeni,3 0 for
example, while the court questioned the accuracy of the debtor's projected
expenses, it held that a debtor has a right to bankruptcy relief and refused to
dismiss the petition under section 707(b) because the debtor was ineligible for
either chapter 11 or chapter 13 relief. Other courts have rejected close review
of the debtor's income and expense projections, reasoning that the
"substantial abuse" test can appropriately be invoked to justify exclusion of
only extreme cases. Thus, in In re Edwards3 1 the court, in forebearing to
dismiss the debtor's petition under section 707(b), took the opportunity to
comment that it would review few cases and would normally give deference to
the debtor's reported expense estimates.
It may fairly be concluded that section 707(b) does not require extreme
financial hardship as a precondition to a grant of bankruptcy relief under
chapter 7. The substantial abuse standard requires no specific levels or
degrees of hardship, but only requires genuine effort and fair dealing by the
debtor. When bankruptcy can be related to identifiable and unexpected
financial setbacks, a debtor seeking relief is guilty of no abuse.3 2 Such a
debtor with an expectation of income qualifies for chapter 7 relief if he
previously has made good faith efforts-whether or not successful-to pay
and to protect his creditors' interests in receiving payment. Where, however,
the debtor has acted otherwise, dismissal is appropriate. The debtor in Bryant
misstated or concealed assets, and the debtor in Grant failed to propose a
reasonable budget and piled up cash advances and consumer purchases in
excess of his ability to pay. In both cases, the finding of abuse turned not only
on a close assessment of the debtor's income potential, but also more broadly
on the view that to obtain relief in bankruptcy, the debtor must deal
honorably with his creditors.

29. See In re Christian, 51 Bankr. 118 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985) (court cannot act on trustee or
creditor suggestion). But see In re Hudson, 56 Bankr. 415 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (court overlooks
limited creditor involvement in raising the issue).
30. 56 Bankr. 456 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
31. 50 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
32. See In re White, 49 Bankr. 869 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (petitioner subject to large tort
judgment not guilty of abuse).
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IV
ABUSE AND PREBANKRUPTCY PLANNING

Most consumer bankruptcies are initiated voluntarily by the debtor after
his assessment of the relative pros and cons of available alternatives.
Accordingly, some debtors will seek to structure their affairs to optimize the
benefits of their choice. In most cases, the decision to file bankruptcy and the
selection of a bankruptcy format (i.e., chapter 7 or chapter 13) is not directly
constrained by law. Similarly, subject only to a lien created by contract or law,
a debtor normally retains absolute control of his assets, enjoying the right to
convey and use that property for his maximum personal benefit prior to his
filing bankruptcy.
Some indirect constraints do, however, apply. These constraints entail
balancing the need of the debtor for flexibility with the need of creditor
interests for protection against excessive debtor manipulation. Thus, the
individual debtor's use or acquisition of property is limited by standards
defining fraud and misrepresentation. Further, the Bankruptcy Code limits
some eve-of-bankruptcy transfers to particular creditors: In some instances,
not only may the transfer be avoided, but the debtor may also be barred from
discharge of any of his debts.3 3 In other instances, a particular debt may be
excluded from discharge or the recovery of the transferred property may be
34
permitted.
In general, however, a debtor may arrange his assets and selectively pay
creditors to his benefit. Such planning by lawyers to maximize a business
client's gain is common, but such planning for consumers is less well accepted
and has encountered some emotional objection.3 5 From one perspective,
planning is seen as manipulation, altering the effects of the bankruptcy
process in a manner that arguably constitutes abuse. This view assumes that
all consumers should naively base their decisions on nonlegal factors. In
practice, however, consumers do so only if they act without informed advice;
soundly counseled, they adjust their behavior in response to known risks and
anticipated contingencies. 3 6 The proper policy question thus focuses on the
type and degree of planning that is permissible.
Consumer debtor planning is neither more nor less acceptable and
inevitable than business debtor planning. In consumer cases, however,
consideration of what controls are appropriate requires not only a judgment
about what planning is unobjectionable, but also a realistic view of how
planning decisions are actually made. There is a temptation to assume that
individuals are adequately informed and act rationally or have access to
33. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (transfer avoidable if preferential and not
exempted); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985) (debt not discharged when incurred by fraud).
35. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 992-94.
36. See Nimmer, supra note 1; Nimmer, Secured Creditor and the Automatic Stay: Variable Bargain
Models of Fairness, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1983); Jackson, Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy Entitlements, and the
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982); Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 992.
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counsel to aid in assessing choices. In fact, however, although some
consumer debtors may have foreknowledge of bankruptcy effects, in many
cases they lack legal sophistication and act without the benefit of competent
professional advice. A lawyer may be retained to prepare and file the
bankruptcy petition, but he is often not involved until the last moment, after
many important decisions may already have been made. Even then, the
lawyer-client relationship is often so brief and of such limited scope as to rule
out significant adjustment of the debtor's financial status prior to filing.
Several distinct patterns of planning occur in consumer bankruptcies. In
one, the individual debtor, naive and uncounseled, makes no effort to adjust
his economic condition in contemplation of bankruptcy. When a lawyer is
contacted, he makes no suggestions about restructuring the debtor's assets.
He may view consumer bankruptcy planning as ethically inappropriate; or
such planning may be either impossible, owing to the debtor's indigency, or
unnecessary, because the debtor will receive maximum discharge benefits and
lose no assets without any further adjustment. Alternatively, the lawyer may
lack the necessary knowledge or time to render such planning service. In any
event, the debtor files in a truly "natural" condition. Significantly, the limited
empirical evidence available suggests that this pattern is seen in most
37
consumer bankruptcy cases.
In a variant pattern, the lawyer who prepares the bankruptcy petition
assumes a more active role and advises the debtor to optimize his position
prior to filing. 3 8 To this end, the debtor engages in last-minute transactions,
converting assets from one form to another or making payments to retain
relationships with particular creditors-for example, paying the utility
company, paying the home mortgage.
In another variant, the debtor early recognizes the possibility of
bankruptcy and begins accordingly to adjust in order to optimize his position.
In some cases, these early adjustments are informed by expert advice, but
more often the debtor shifts assets and grants preferences based on a
colloquial or "intuitive" knowledge of the legal effect of such actions.3 9 When
a lawyer is eventually involved in a case so structured for bankruptcy, many of
the transactions are completed, and the only remaining issue is whether and
how any harm to the debtor can be avoided by timing the filing.

37. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM 47-49 (1971)
(bankruptcy filing precipitated by collection efforts, often preceded by severe financial setback);
Shuchman, The Average Bankrupt: A Description and Analysis of 753 Personal Bankruptcy Filings in Nine
States, 88 COM. L.J. 288 (1983); Woodward & Woodward, Exemptions as an Incentive to Voluntary
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Study, 88 COM. L.J. 309 (1983). See also 1 CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER,
KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE UNIVERSITY, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY

35 (1982). This is not to suggest, however, that planning does not occur. See Resnick, Prudent
Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the
Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 643-46 (1978).
38. See Resnick, supra note 37.
39. See, e.g., In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
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As these patterns suggest, the fact that transactions occur shortly before
40
bankruptcy does not, in itself, necessarily indicate fraud or illegality.
Although legal doctrine affecting business cases may correctly assume the
availability of long-term guidance and advance planning and may regard eveof-bankruptcy transactions with some suspicion, a similar assumption in
consumer cases belies reality. The opportunity for counseled planning in
these cases often does not arise until just before filing. Consumer debtor
behavior shortly before bankruptcy should not be immune from scrutiny, but
a doctrine categorically voiding eve-of-bankruptcy transactions would be
overbroad and would substantially nullify the ability of such debtors to plan
for bankruptcy.
Similarly, the fact that a debtor has acted after consulting counsel does not
necessarily indicate fraudulent motivation. In business cases, it is acceptable
for clients routinely to consult counsel prior to filing; and in consumer cases,
analogous planning should not be characterized as illicit or unethical.
Depending on what transactions are effected after the consultation, the
debtor's conduct may, in fact, give meaningful expression to the ideal that
individuals should be fully informed of their legal rights.
Prebankruptcy transactions often involve no express consideration of
bankruptcy. Individual debtors generally perform only a relatively superficial
analysis of the potential effect of their prebankruptcy transactions. The
behavior of individuals under stress is often erratic and irrational, and this
pattern must be considered in developing doctrines to define the range of
acceptable prebankruptcy conduct by an individual debtor. Finely tuned,
technical approaches are inappropriate. Concepts of deterrence cannot be
based on detailed foreknowledge by the debtor of the consequences of his
acts. Rather, doctrines applicable to consumer behavior should be flexible
and intuitively obvious, permitting common or ordinary actions and
prohibiting only actions that smack of common fraud and deception, where
the likelihood of harm is substantial and courts can realistically assume the
debtor's awareness of the wrongful character of the act.
Bankruptcy planning involves four major objectives: to increase the assets
retained by the debtor after bankruptcy, to reduce the extent of his liabilities
after bankruptcy, to maintain his relationships with selected creditors, and to
benefit persons whom he wishes to prefer. The Bankruptcy Code and related
case law are quite permissive in sanctioning planning to attain each of these
objectives, condoning most activities in which the common indicia of fraud
are not present.
A.

Exemptions and Fraudulent Conveyances

Although, as a general rule, a debtor may deal freely with his property,
prebankruptcy planning through transfers of property is limited by the law of
40. See Love v. Manick, 341 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1965) (two days prebankruptcy acceptable);
Goggin v. Dudley, 72 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1947), aff'd per curiam, 166 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1948)
(one week).
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fraudulent conveyances. A transfer made by a debtor within a year before
bankruptcy with intent to defraud creditors constitutes grounds for denial of a
chapter 7 discharge, 41 and in many cases, the transfer itself may be avoided
and the property recovered for distribution to creditors.
The right to free use of his property and the law of fraud may collide when
the debtor converts his assets from nonexempt to exempt status shortly
before filing. In some cases, the conversion may consist of using nonexempt
cash as a downpayment on a mortgage or security interest in exempt
property. In other cases, nonexempt property may be sold and the proceeds
used to acquire exempt property-the effect of which is to insulate the
property from unsecured creditor claims in bankruptcy distribution and
preserve it for the debtor, free of creditor claims. 42 Although not explicitly
articulated in the statute, an intent to reiterate prior law countenancing such
conversions is revealed in the legislative history of the Code: "As under
current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert nonexempt property into
exempt property before filing a bankruptcy petition. The practice is not
fraudulent as to creditors and permits the debtor to make full use of the
'43
exemptions to which he is entitled under the law."
The suggestion that such a transfer or conversion is wrongful essentially
presupposes that the consumer should enter bankruptcy in a "natural state"
as to exempt property. To understand the basis of this constraint, one must
first understand the character of the alleged harm in a conversion. 44
The main objection to exemption conversion lies in the fact that it benefits
the debtor at the expense of his unsecured creditors-although there is some
risk that unencumbered property may in any event be dissipated by the debtor
quite independent of any exemption conversion. Nevertheless, one observer
contends that all such conversions should be precluded by analogy to
preferences, since the debtor in effect receives more favored treatment vis-avis his creditors as a result of his own actions. Arguably, bankruptcy policy
precludes redistribution of assets by means of such prefiling transfers.4 5 But
the Bankruptcy Code, in fact, supplies no support for such analysis. Indeed,
current bankruptcy law protects most preferences given by a consumer
debtor, 4 6 and bankruptcy policy, in fact, does not proscribe most prefiling
transfers that reallocate his assets.
An exemption has a different effect in a bankruptcy context as compared to
a nonbankruptcy context. Outside of bankruptcy, exemptions preserve the
value of affected property to the debtor only on a transitory basis: If an exempt
41.
42.
43.

11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Id. § 522.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6317.
44. See In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1976);
Wudrick v. Clements, 451 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1971); Forsberg v. Security State Bank, 15 F.2d 499 (8th
Cir. 1926); In re Blum, 41 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
45. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 992-97; Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in
Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REV. 327, 340-43 (1982).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1)-(3), (7) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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asset is subsequently converted by the debtor into nonexempt property, it can
be reached by his unsecured creditors. In contrast, a bankruptcy exemption
permanently preserves the value of property to the debtor as against his
unsecured creditors whose claims have been discharged: The exempt asset
subsequently can be converted by the debtor into any form and still remain
immune to the claims of his prefiling creditors.
This difference supports the conclusion that prefiling conversions are a valid
planning strategy for consumer debtors. 4 7 By sanctioning exemptions, the
Bankruptcy Code defines the acceptable value that can be retained by a
debtor, 48 and his conversion of assets into exempt form merely exercises
more fully his right to retain that value. The value limits placed on
exemptions balance the desired protection for the debtor against the claims of
his unsecured creditors. While in most consumer cases, few assets remain
after exemptions, this result is not attributable to bankruptcy planning, but
rather to the indigence of those debtors who file bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy exemption rules traditionally defer to state law, creating local
variations in the extent of this protection. Although the Bankruptcy Code sets
forth a separate schedule of federal exemptions as an alternative to statesanctioned exemptions, states can bar their use in bankruptcy, 49 which most
states do, confining debtors to only those exemptions available under state
law. These state laws vary widely, but the rationale for recognizing them in
bankruptcy lies in the fact that they provide a continuous legal framework for
unsecured lending. While this situation gives to state exemption rules an
effect that they do not have outside of bankruptcy, it does not violate their
purpose. Congress simply chose to permit different schemes of protected
value by adopting judgments made by other legislatures.
Other aspects of the Bankruptcy Code reflect a federal policy of protecting
an individual debtor's right to plan his asset acquisitions and transfers to
insure maximum benefit from his exemptions. Section 522 allows him to
avoid a nonpurchase money security interest that impairs an exemption. 50 An
FTC regulation expands this rule by characterizing the taking of such a
security interest as an unfair trade practice. 5 1 Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code
grants the individual debtor a right to redeem exempt personal property from
a security interest by paying the appraised value of the property, 52 which
contradicts state law rules requiring payment of the entire debt in order to
redeem collateral.
47. Compare Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 992-97; Vukowich, supra note 4, at 1139-40.
48. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)(5) (Supp. III 1985). A homestead exemption of a fixed dollar
value is permitted, and a portion of any unused amount of this exemption may be reallocated to "any
property."
49. See 1 W. NORTON, supra note 2.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982).
51. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(9)(2) (1986).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1982). See In re Williams, 8 Bankr. 318 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980); In re
Miller, 4 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980).
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The debtor's right to convert his assets into exempt property, although
universally recognized, is defeasible where the conversion has been made with
an actual intent to defraud creditors. 53 This restraint is only infrequently
invoked and constitutes a largely ad hoc effort to define the outer limits of fair
dealing. Typically it limits conversions involving excessive value and abusive
conduct such as active deception.
Fraudulent conveyance law applies to two types of transfer. 5 4 In one, an
insolvent debtor conveys property for less than its fair equivalent value,
impairing his creditors' ability to collect. This type of fraudulent conveyance
seldom figures in exemption conversions since in most such cases, the debtor
receives equivalent value for the exchanged assets. The second type of
fraudulent conveyance-more significant in this context-involves a transfer
with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
When fraudulent conveyance law applies to an exemption conversion, two
results may follow. First, denial of the exemption may make the recovered
assets available for distribution to creditors, although this result is precluded
in some states by local law rendering exemption claims invulnerable to
allegations of fraud. 55 Second, the fraud may preclude the debtor's discharge
if the fraud occurred within one year of bankruptcy and was committed with
an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. While denial of the
exemption is a state law issue, denial of discharge is a function of federal
56
law.
The central issue in fraudulent conveyance cases often involves
distinguishing between an intent to defraud and an intent merely to convert
property. In discussing this distinction, some courts differentiate between an
intent to acquire property and an intent merely to deprive creditors of
value. 5 7 This distinction is, however, unworkable. In any exemption
conversion, the debtor's motive almost invariably includes a desire to
safeguard assets from the claims of creditors, and this intent must be honored
as long as the legitimacy of exemption planning is recognized.
A more productive analytical framework requires some extrinsic proof of
fraud beyond the mere act of conversion itself.58 Such an analysis focuses on
characteristics that distinguish a particular conversion and place it beyond the
bounds of fair dealing. A conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt
53. See In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1983); Miguel v. Walsh, 447 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.
1971); Shanks v. Hardin, 101 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1939); In re Martin, 217 F. Supp. 937 (D. Or. 1963).
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982); 2 W. NORTON, supra note 2, at §§ 34.01-34.10.
55. See In re Olson, 45 Bankr. 501, 504 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); Resnick, supra note 37, at 641-43.
56. In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Olson, 45 Bankr. 501, 504-05 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1984).
57. See Shanks v. Hardin, 101 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1939); Kangas v. Robie, 264 F. 92 (8th Cir.
1920); Resnick, supra note 37, at 638.
58. See In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1003-1004 (2d
Cir. 1976); Wudrick v. Clements, 451 F.2d 988, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1971); Miguel v. Walsh, 447 F.2d
724, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1971); Shanks v. Hardin, 101 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1939); Forsberg v. Security
State Bank, 15 F.2d 499, 501 (8th Cir. 1926); In re Blum, 41 Bankr. 816, 818 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984);
In re Martin, 217 F. Supp. 937, 938 (D. Or. 1963).
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property is valid unless: 1) the size or value of the conversion embraces
virtually all of the debtor's assets; 2) there were misrepresentations or devices
used to distract creditors and dissuade them from acting to prevent the
conversion; and 3) the conversion occurred in conjunction with other actions
59
typically associated with abuse of bankruptcy.
In re Reed 60 illustrates how multiple factors coalesce into a finding of
fraudulent intent. The debtor operated a small business and was also a
commission salesman for a clothing company. Seven months before filing, he
negotiated a postponement of collection efforts by his creditors for one year.
Four months before bankruptcy, he acquired numerous collectibles financed
in part by a loan he caused to be made to a corporation he had formed for tax
purposes. Two months before bankruptcy, he diverted business income into a
private account from which he repaid the loan that had been made to the
corporation. Within weeks of filing, Reed sold the collectibles for less than
their purchase price and applied the proceeds to reduce the mortgage on his
homestead, which was fully exempt. A substantial number of other assets
could not be accounted for. When Reed filed bankruptcy, his income was
approximately $180,000 per year. The court held that this pattern of facts
supported an inference of fraudulent intent:
His rapid conversion of nonexempt assets . . . four months before bankruptcy after
arranging . .. to be free of payment obligations until the following year, speaks for
itself. [The debtor's] diversion of the daily receipts.., into an account unknown to his
creditors... confirm[s] his fraudulent motivation. It would constitute a perversion of
the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code to permit a debtor earning $180,000 a year to
convert every one of his major nonexempt assets into sheltered property on the eve of
bankruptcy . . . and then emerge washed clean of future obligation by carefully
61
concocted immersion in bankruptcy waters.

Although it is not fraudulent per se for a debtor to transform value into
exempt assets, where other indicia of wrongdoing conduce to an overall
pattern of abuse, misrepresentation, and concealment, exemption
conversions will not be protected.
B.

Preferences

Consistent with the principle that debtors retain control of their property
before filing bankruptcy, they may generally transfer property to selected
creditors even if the transfer disproportionately benefits one creditor vis-a-vis
the others. The planning purpose in such transfers generally is to favor a
creditor to whom the debtor feels a sentimental obligation or with whom he
desires to maintain an ongoing, valued relationship. Alternatively, the intent
may not infrequently be to benefit a third party who is also obligated on the
debt.
59. See, e.g., In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1976);
Wudrick v. Clements, 451 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1971); In re White, 221 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
Compare Resnick, supra note 37, at 634.

60.
61.

700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 990 (citations omitted).
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In bankruptcy law, a preference is a transfer of property by an insolvent
debtor on account of an antecedent debt that enables the creditor to receive
more than he would in a chapter 7 proceeding. 6 2 Unlike exemption
conversions, preferences do not beneficially inure to the debtor. Moreover,
since preferences are, by definition, made in payment of valid debts, they do
not import any suggestion of fraud. If bankruptcy occurs within ninety days
(or up to a year if the favored creditor is an insider), however, a preferential
transfer can be avoided and the property recovered by the trustee unless one
of a number of statutory exceptions applies. 63 No other sanction is imposed
on the debtor.
The policy objection to preferences lies not in their intrinsic wrongfulness,
but rather in the discriminatory distribution of the debtor's property they
effect among his creditors. Preference rules also indirectly limit aggressive
creditor collection efforts, rendering the results potentially avoidable in
bankruptcy. Since the debtor actually owes an obligation to the creditor who
receives the preference-an obligation that the debtor in many cases is merely
electing to pay before his other obligations-avoiding the transfer denies him
legitimate control of his property and penalizes the preferred creditor for
accepting what he was entitled to receive under state law.
Section 547 does not require proof of wrongful intent as a condition of the
avoidance power it confers on the trustee, and it potentially affects many
transfers made shortly before bankruptcy whether or not planning or pressure
was involved. Under current law, however, most transfers by consumers are
not avoidable as preferences because section 547 insulates ordinary-course
consumer credit behavior from this sanction. 64 This scheme creates an
opportunity for planning through preferential payment of selected creditors.
Since most ordinary-course transfers made by consumers shortly before
bankruptcy are not related to bankruptcy planning, however, consumer
preference law generally focuses on extraordinary transfers. Two further
exceptions provide a planning framework. The first excludes transfers
(including payments) to fully secured creditors. 6 5 The significance of this
exception, of course, is that many major consumer liabilities are secured, and
the exclusion of these transfers effectively permits the diversion of cash
resources to protect a fully encumbered asset. The second excludes any
62. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982).
63. Id. § 547(c).
64. See 2 W. NORTON, supra note 2, at §§ 32.14-32.19. A major change enacted in preference law
in 1984 modified the ordinary-course transfer protection by eliminating a condition that the payment
be made within 45 days after the debt had been incurred. This 45-day period had led to substantial
litigation and had resulted in the avoidance of many normal payments owing to the determination as
to when the debt had been incurred and the payment made. See In re Emerald Oil Co., 695 F.2d 833,
835-37 (5th Cir. 1983) (debt incurred when legal liability arises); In re Iowa Premium Service Co.,
Inc., 695 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 1982); Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 509-11
(7th Cir. 1981) (installment payments); In re Thomas Garland Inc., 19 Bankr. 920 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1982) (utility service debt incurred when meter read).
65. See Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 511 (7th Cir. 1981); Nimmer, Security
Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview of Section 547 of the Code, 17 Hous. L. REV. 289 (1980); 2 W. NORTON
supra note 2, at § 32.09.
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transfer to a creditor if the aggregate of all property affected is less than
$60066 if the claims against the debtor are "primarily" consumer debts.
Measured against consumer liabilities, the protected transfers may be
relatively large, providing wide latitude for selective payment.
C.

Fraudulent Acquisitions

Fraud is a consistent theme in abuse law. It restricts not only conveyances
or asset conversions by the debtor, but also his acquisitionof assets on credit in
contemplation of bankruptcy where the party conveying the asset is defrauded
in the transaction. The critical inquiry here is precisely what consumer
conduct constitutes fraudulent acquisition of property.
This issue arises under section 523, which bars from discharge any debts
incurred through fraudulent misrepresentations of facts and written
misrepresentations related to the debtor's financial condition. 6 7 This
exclusion focuses on the specific debt and protects the particular creditor who
was defrauded. The underlying policy requires honesty by the debtor at the
inception of the transaction as a condition precedent for relief (discharge)
from that claim.
The fraud exception has occasioned controversy in several contexts,
especially because of the difficult proof problems it presents. A common
sequence involves a debtor who has obtained property on credit and files
bankruptcy shortly thereafter. If a formal loan application procedure was
employed, there may be questions as to whether the debtor misrepresented
his financial condition and whether the creditor relied thereon. If the debtor
used a credit card, the difficulties are compounded. Although there is general
consensus that major credit purchases one or two days before bankruptcy are
not proper, a credit card purchase involving no contemporaneous financial
review is more problematic.
Fraud requires proof of an actual
misrepresentation, but any misrepresentation here would be only implicit.
Nor is there any general policy that requires an individual debtor to
discontinue use of his credit cards during periods of financial distress,
although the mere act of obtaining credit in contemplation of bankruptcy
entails at least apparent overreaching.
Use of a credit card shortly before bankruptcy engenders the suspicion
that the debtor may have obtained the credit with no intention to pay. The
image of a spending spree undertaken immediately prior to filing, followed by
a bankruptcy discharge that leaves the debtor with the benefit of the
acquisitions but relieved of the liabilities, is indefensible. But this situation
often can be distinguished only with difficulty from one of merely excessive
and ill-advised credit spending followed by belated recognition of the
impossibility of payment, for which bankruptcy concededly affords a remedy.
66.
67.

11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (Supp. III 1985).
Id. § 523(a)(2).
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Prior to 1984, the credit card cases were in conflict. One line of authority
held that if the debtor never intended to pay his debts, use of a credit card
shortly before bankruptcy constituted fraud. 68 Proof of such an original
intent is difficult to establish, however, and in practice, this rule was limited to
the most egregious cases, where large purchases had been made shortly
before filing. Under the other line of authority, however, intent not to pay
69
was not held to be fraud.
These latter cases sanctioned planning to accumulate assets with the
deliberate purpose of avoiding reciprocal obligations to pay for them. This
exclusion of misrepresented intent placed an important limitation on the
availability of fraud to bar a debtor's discharge where the credit problems
involved mere nonperformance of contract. Overlying this split of authority,
moreover, there was also a dispute about whether the debtor had
misrepresented his financial condition in a form sufficient to satisfy the
discharge exception set forth in section 523(a)(2). Like its predecessor, this
provision requires a written misrepresentation by the debtor of his financial
condition; but the only writing in the credit card sale is the charge receipt,
which contains no explicit representation about the debtor's financial
condition.
A 1984 amendment to section 523, however, establishes a presumption
that consumer debt incurred shortly before bankruptcy is nondischargeable if
it is for goods and services unrelated to the reasonable needs of the debtor, is
owed to a single creditor and aggregates more than $500, and was incurred
within forty days of bankruptcy; or if it consists of cash advances aggregating
more than $1000 obtained within twenty days. 70 This presumption overrules
cases holding misrepresented intent to pay not to be fraudulent and, in effect,
defines a particular type of abuse and a form of fraud uniquely associated with
bankruptcy proceedings. As in other contexts, the abuse standard entails, at
least in part, a measure of excess and overreaching gauged in discernable
monetary terms.
V
ABUSE AND CHAPTER

13

Under chapter 13, as contrasted with chapter 7, the debtor can retain his
assets rather than being compelled to surrender them for liquidation. In
return for this dispensation, chapter 13 requires the debtor to make payments
to his creditors over a period of time pursuant to a plan that has been
proposed by the debtor and confirmed by the bankruptcy court.
Confirmation standards invoke both economic considerations and subjective
measures relating to good faith and feasibility. Under the newly revised
68. See In re Senty, 42 Bankr. 456, 459-61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Buford, 25 Bankr. 477
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Stewart, 7 Bankr. 551, 554-56 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
69. See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Wood, 571 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1978); Davison-Paxon Co. v.
Caidwell, 115 F.2d 189, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(c) (Supp. III 1985).
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chapter 13, as a condition of confirmation, creditors may insist that the debtor
commit all of his disposable earnings to payments under the plan. 71
Disputes about the role of chapter 13 in consumer credit were central to
the controversy that swirled about consumer bankruptcy in 1984. Issues of
abuse in chapter 13 may arise in two ways. First, it may be an abuse of
bankruptcy for an individual debtor to file under chapter 7 instead of chapter
13 if he has sufficient disposable income substantially to pay his debts. This
issue now arises in the context of "substantial abuse" under section 707(b)
and focuses on whether debtors can be forced into a wage-based bankruptcy
proceeding. Second, the circumstances surrounding filing or the formulation
of a plan under chapter 13 may raise sui generis issues about abuse of chapter
13 relief itself.
There is no single format analogous to section 707(b) under which to
discuss abuse in chapter 13. Issues of abuse of chapter 13 are raised under
the confirmation standard that a plan be proposed in good faith, 7 2 under
standards for relief from the automatic stay for cause, 7 3 or under standards
for dismissing a case or converting it from chapter 13 to chapter 7. The
standards for dismissal in section 1307 include a variety of specific events and
general cause.7 4 In addition, several specific abuses of chapter 13 were
explicitly dealt with in the 1984 amendments.
A.

Selection of Chapter 13 and Incentives

A definition of bankruptcy abuse in chapter 13 requires an understanding
of what might lead a debtor to use that procedure instead of proceeding
under chapter 7. As an initial premise, chapter 13 is seldom chosen in order
to reduce transfers of value to creditors. To be confirmed, a chapter 13 plan
must contemplate distribution to creditors of assets with a present value not
less than that of the assets they would have received in a chapter 7
liquidation. 7 5 Moreover, if an unsecured creditor objects, the plan must
provide for full payment or for commitment of all of the debtor's disposable
income to the plan over the three-year period. 76 During the pendency of the
plan, the debtor and his creditors have the right to petition to modify the
71. Id. § 1325(b).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982). See Cyr, The Chapter 13 "Good Faith" Tempest: Analysis and
ProposalforChange, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 271 (1981).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1982). See Nimmer, supra note 36; Jackson, supra note 36.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (1982) requires a request by a party in interest but allows the court to
dismiss or convert the case to a chapter 7 proceeding for "cause," defined as including unreasonable
delay prejudicial to creditors, failure to file a plan on a timely basis, and a failure to commence
payments required before confirmation under new section 1326. As to general concepts of "cause,"
compare In re Baker, 736 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1984) (fact that a chapter 7 petition had been filed within
six years), with In re Beauty, 42 Bankr. 655 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1984) (fact that chapter 13 petition had
been filed within a month after chapter 7 discharge and applied only to secured claims that survived
the earlier cause for dismissal).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982). See In re Knipping, 40 Bankr. 865 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1984); In
re Hawkins, 33 Bankr. 908 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (as to debts nondischargeable in chapter 7).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (1982).
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plan, presumably to adjust its terms to meet changed income and other
77
relevant circumstances.
In addition to requiring transfers of equal or greater value to creditors, a
chapter 13 plan commonly places longer-term restraints on the debtor than
does a chapter 7 proceeding. In a liquidation, the entire case is often
completed within several months of filing. In contrast, chapter 13 plans
typically require performance over a period of years, during which time the
debtor's disposable income is diverted into payments to his creditors.
Given these comparative drawbacks, what motivates an individual to
undertake a greater obligation under chapter 13? One possible explanation
involves a rational choice based on informed assessment of tangible
incentives. Consistent with encouraging its use, chapter 13 provides relief
that may be superior to that available under chapter 7. The chapter 13
discharge involves fewer exceptions than does the chapter 7 discharge. 78
Chapter 13 procedures permit retention of encumbered property despite
prior defaults. 79 Furthermore, social conceptions and credit reports
traditionally favor debtors who use chapter 13 over those who use chapter 7.
This reputational value reinforces the perceived and actual advantages of
chapter 13 vis-a-vis chapter 7 and persuades some debtors to regard it more
favorably despite the greater transfer of value to creditors that it usually
entails.
Many benefits in chapter 13 are contextually variant, however, and are
present only for a small fraction of all consumers. For example, to encourage
its use, a completed chapter 13 proceeding provides a broader discharge than
does a chapter 7 proceeding, overriding most of the exceptions to discharge
specified under section 523. Thus, a debtor who has obtained money through
false pretenses or a student loan-debts that are nondischargeable under
chapter 7 0 -may be discharged of either debt under chapter 13. 8 1 But this
incentive operates only if the debtor has debts of this type, anticipates that an
exception to their discharge may be interposed in chapter 7, and actually
expects to perform the plan in full. Similarly, another variable incentive is
that a chapter 13 debtor retains all of his property, including items that are
not exempt.8 2 This feature of chapter 13 allows the more financially
substantial debtor to preserve assets that otherwise would be relinquished,
but it is unimportant to most consumer debtors, who typically have little or no
nonexempt property.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (Supp. III 1985) was modified in 1984 expressly to include the
possiblity of modification of the plan after confirmation at the request of the holder of an allowed
unsecured claim.
78. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982) with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1982).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (8) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
81. See In re Gibson, 45 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985); In re Prine, 10 Bankr. 87 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1981).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (1982).
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Another distinctive aspect of a chapter 13 proceeding is its effect on
secured credit. Unless invalidated by a specific provision of the Code, a
security interest remains enforceable in and after bankruptcy despite the fact
that the debtor is discharged of personal liability for the underlying debt. In
chapter 7 proceedings, this rule places the debtor at risk of losing
encumbered property unless he is able to reach an accommodation with the
secured creditor or has sufficient cash to redeem the property from the
security interest. Chapter 13 proceedings, however, give the debtor a right to
force a restructured payment schedule on a secured creditor in nonresidential
property8 3 and to delay or avert foreclosure of a security interest by curing
84
default over a reasonable time.
An alternative explanation for chapter 13 use invokes the overriding
influence of environmental and emotional factors. Many individuals desire to
pay their debts, and chapter 13 is the bankruptcy option best suited to this
objective. Other factors that may incline a debtor towards chapter 13 are the
preferences of lawyers, the personally perceived stigma of the alternatives, the
preferences of local judges, and the behavior expectations in particular
judicial districts. The debtor's choice in the matter is,8 5in sum, strongly
influenced by the sociolegal environment of his decisions.
Chapter 13 provides the debtor relief from creditor pressure while he is
seeking to pay his debts. A chapter 13 petition automatically stays creditors'
efforts to collect, producing a less harassed environment for the debtor. For
the debtor who desires to make full payment, chapter 13 confirmation
standards permit virtually complete control over the terms of a payment
program that will bind all parties. Consequently, chapter 13 enables the
debtor to design a payment schedule that can be imposed on all of his
creditors without the need to negotiate independently with each one of them.
It is not an abuse of chapter 13 for a debtor to respond positively to these
incentives. If abuses exist, they are associated with seeking to obtain the
benefits without undertaking the commensurate obligations of chapter 13.
We turn briefly to several illustrations of behavior often associated with
perceived abuse.

83. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (5) (1984). See In re Carroll, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 504 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1981); In re Redding, 34 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. M.D. Penn. 1983); In re Davis, 20 Bankr. 212 (Bankr.
C.D. Il. 1982).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1982). See Central Federal Savings & Loan v. King, 23 Bankr. 779
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (31 months to cure is reasonable time); Philadelphia Saving Fund Society v.
Stewart, 16 Bankr. 460, 461-62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (40 months to cure reasonable); In re Hailey,
17 Bankr. 167 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (12 months to cure not reasonable). A mortgage default can
be cured after the underlying debt has been accelerated. See In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir.
1984); Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings Ass'n., 730 F.2d 236, 240-42 (5th Cir. 1984); In re
Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 26-29 (2d Cir. 1982).
85.
See REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. 1, at 15762 (1973); Warren, supra note 6, at 1344-46; Vukowich, supra note 6, at 1364-65.
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Minimal Payment and Bad Faith

Chapter 13 is perceived as a payment remedy designed for debtors willing
to commit their income to the substantial satisfaction of their debts. This view
justifies the more generous relief available under chapter 13 and also explains
why a chapter 13 proceeding is less damaging to the debtor's financial
standing than a chapter 7 proceeding.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, however, a chapter 13 plan proposed in good
faith can be confirmed without consent of creditors if they will receive at least
as much as they would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation. This
economic "best interests" standard was intended to neutralize creditor power
to veto plans that proposed less than 100 percent payment, but it created
unexpected results. Since there would be no assets available in most
consumer cases for distribution to creditors under chapter 7, chapter 13 plans
that contemplated little or no payment to the unsecured creditors could be
confirmed under the economic standard.
The question of whether zero payment plans were an abuse of chapter 13
had preoccupied the courts and Congress prior to 1978. The courts focused
on the requirement that a chapter 13 plan be proposed in good faith. To
understand the controversy, however, it is important to distingush two issues.
The first is whether a minimal payment plan evidences bad faith and is abusive
per se. The second is to what extent a debtor may obtain the extended
benefits available under chapter 13 without making substantial payment to
86
creditors.
Early cases treated the first issue with mixed results.8 7 In one view, the
best interests standard defined the required minimum payment and precluded
further restriction in the guise of a good faith test. The contrary view
regarded some payment to be essential and the use of chapter 13 by a debtor
without undertaking to make any payments to be abusive.
Even before the 1984 amendments, however, this pure issue had become
largely historical. Other than as a violation of the spirit of chapter 13, it is
difficult to identify any harm resulting from the typical zero payment plan in
the ordinary case where the scope of the debtor's discharge and his retention
of property under chapter 13 are no different than would be the case under
chapter 7. The chapter 13 label might perhaps mislead later creditors, but
this is an insufficient reason to develop an elaborate conception of abuse
based on good faith standards. Quite correctly, the appellate courts rejected
the suggestion that low payments constituted bad faith per se,8 8 one court
observing:
86. See In re Gibson, 45 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985); In re Prine, 10 Bankr. 87 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1981) (embezzlement claim). Compare In re Sotter, 28 Bankr. 201, 204-06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983) (bad faith where debts result of criminal conduct), with In re Chase, 43 Bankr. 739 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1984) (no confirmation where debts result of criminal conduct), and In re Stein, 36 Bankr. 521,
523-24 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (no confirmation where sole purpose was to modify secured claim).
87. See, e.g., In re lacovini, 2 Bankr. 256, 265-67 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
88. See In re Hines, 723 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1983); Public Finance Corp. v. Freeman, 712 F.2d 219,
221 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885 (11 th Cir. 1983); United States v. Estus, 695 F.2d
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[T]he plain language of the statute precludes importation of a per se rule of
Quite simply, had
substantial repayment into the "good faith" requirement ....
Congress intended that such repayment be a condition precedent to confirmation of
all Chapter 13 plans it could have in fact explicitly so stated .... Congress did in fact
explicitly set a minimum repayment89 level . . . but that limit is not one requiring
substantial repayment in every plan.

The appellate courts did not, however, reject all consideration of the
quantum of proposed payment in a chapter 13 plan as a determinant of good
faith. It was one factor to be considered in conjunction with such other
factors as the debtor's job history and prospects, his living expenses, the
nature and amount of his unsecured debt, including the manner in which the
debt was incurred, his compliance with obligations accurately to report
income and expenses, and the extent to which any unusual events may have
influenced the bankruptcy filing or the debtor's financial condition. 90
Moreover, the appellate decisions defined two general fact patterns that
suggested bad faith. The first consisted of a minimal payment proposal in the
face of a substantial ability by the debtor to pay. 9 ' This form of abuse
generated the reference by several courts to the job prospects and earning
history of the debtor. The second pattern consisted of an attempt by the
debtor to use chapter 13 to obtain its special benefits without making a best
effort to pay. 9 2 For example, a zero payment plan to discharge an otherwise
nondischargeable debt might signal bad faith if unaccompanied by a best
effort attempt to make payments. As one court noted:
Congress never intended Chapter 13 to serve as a means of avoiding liability by way of
a discharge absent an honest effort to pay obligations.... Bad faith may be found
where the primary purpose . . . is to obtain a discharge of an otherwise
which does not indicate a
nondischargeable debt through a nominal payment plan
93
sincere desire to pay creditors to the best of his ability.

This analysis was substantially changed, however, by the 1984
amendments. The economic standard for confirmation now has two tiers. If
no unsecured creditor objects to a proposed payment schedule, the plan can
be confirmed if unsecured creditors receive no less than they would have
received under a chapter 7 liquidation. But if an unsecured creditor does
311, 316-17 (8th Cir. 1982); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982);
Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982); Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193, 197-200 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
89. Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968, 970-71 (4th Cir. 1982).
90. See In re Hines, 723 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1983); Public Finance Corp. v. Freeman, 712 F.2d 219,
221 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885, 888-89 (11th Cir. 1983); Memphis Bank & Trust
Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431-32 (6th Cir. 1982); Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th
Cir. 1982); Ravenot v. Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426, 431-33 (7th Cir. 1982).
91. See, e.g., In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885 (1lth Cir. 1983); Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th
Cir. 1982).
92. See, e.g., Ravenot v. Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982).
93. In re Keiser, 35 Bankr. 496, 498 (Bankr. D. Del. 1983). See In re Gibson, 45 Bankr. 783
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985) (student loan discharged); In re Prine, 10 Bankr. 87 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981)
(embezzlement claim). Compare In re Sotter, 28 Bankr. 201, 204-06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (bad faith
where debts result of criminal conduct), with In re Chase, 43 Bankr. 739, 744-45 (Bankr. D. Md. 1984)
(no confirmation where debt result of criminal conduct), and In re Stein, 36 Bankr. 633 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1983) (no confirmation where sole purpose was to modify secured claim).
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object to a plan that proposes less than payment in full, the plan cannot be
confirmed unless "all of the debtor's disposable income to be received" over
94
the next three years "will be applied to make payment under the plan."
Disposable income is defined as the amount beyond that "reasonably
necessary" for support of the debtor and dependents and for maintaining the
95
debtor's business.
These standards exclude the possibility that low payment, without more,
can successfully be adduced as an independent and self-sufficient ground of
bad faith. Whether the standards also alter the case law in which minimal
payment is a factor in a broader analysis of abuse is less clear. Conceivably, a
minimal payment plan coupled with otherwise nondischargeable debts can
still be described as abusive, but the better approach would be to reject this
analysis. Chapter 13 gives creditors an opportunity to object to an inadequate
proposal and forces the debtor to apply his disposable income to the payment
of his obligations. Creditors can, moreover, obtain judicial modification of
payment schedules if the debtor's disposable income increases. Requiring a
debtor under chapter 13 to propose payment to his creditors of more than his
disposable income creates an insuperable obstacle to bankruptcy relief not
warranted in equity or law. Likewise, rejecting a payment proposal to which
the creditors have not objected is unduly solicitous of the creditors' rights. It
should not be deemed abusive for a debtor to comply with the standards of
chapter 13 in order to attain its enhanced benefits if he has fully committed
his disposable earnings to the proposed plan, even if these earnings actually
permit only meager payment of his debts.
C.

Delay, Lack of Effort, and Multiple Filings

As the discussion of minimal payment plans indicates, one element of
abuse law relating to chapter 13 is the requirement that the debtor's
motivation be consistent with the intended purpose and scope of the remedy.
While a mismatch between motivation and system objective is most apparent
in connection with meaningful payment issues, other aspects of this theme
arise in connection with a developing law of abuse and require at least brief
comment.
One form of abuse under chapter 13 consists of the debtor's efforts to use
the petition and the resulting automatic stay to delay a creditor's foreclosure
against encumbered property. Without more, such tactics are not necessarily
inconsistent with the underlying rationale of chapter 13. If the debtor, in fact,
intends to implement a payment schedule or to cure a default through his
plan, he is entitled to protection from unconstructive creditor harassment
while seeking to do so. Delaying creditor enforcement action in this context
does not necessarily constitute abuse; abuse exists only where the intention to
94.
95.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (Supp. I 1985).
Id. § 1325(b)(2).
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delay is not accompanied by an intent to perform a confirmable plan under
chapter 13.
A fact pattern that often raises questions is seen when a chapter 13 petition
is filed shortly before the completion of a foreclosure sale. Although the
language in some cases might suggest that a filing on the eve of a foreclosure
sale is an abuse of bankruptcy and bad faith, 96 this analysis misinterprets the
Code. Unless more is established, the use of bankruptcy to preserve property
to the debtor in the face of a foreclosure is permitted; abuse arises only if
delay is the debtor's sole objective and he has no intent seriously to work
through the chapter 13 proceeding. Creditors are further protected by
express statutory requirements concerning the timeliness of payments
proposed in a plan, which, under section 1326, unless a contrary court order
is obtained, must be commenced within thirty days after the plan is filed.
Failure by the debtor so to conform is expressly defined as a basis for
dismissal.
Use of chapter 13 to delay creditors without intent to make payments may
also be evidenced by repetitive petitions filed after each prior case is
dismissed or the creditor obtains an order granting relief from the stay.
Although multiple filings under chapter 13 were not expressly barred under
prior law, courts relied on concepts of good faith or abuse of the spirit of
chapter 13 to justify dismissal of such cases for cause. 9 7 In some instances, in
order to forestall debtor manipulation of the court, a dismissal was coupled
with an order enjoining the debtor from filing another petition within a
specified time period.
Multiple filings over a brief time period in the face of impending
foreclosure creates a presumption of abuse. Some cases of repeated filings,
however, do not involve bad faith efforts to use chapter 13 solely for purposes
of obtaining a delay, but rather can be explained in terms of the changing
financial circumstances of the debtor.9 8 The Code now amplifies the
framework for dealing with this form of abuse. Section 109(f) provides that
no individual can be a debtor in a case within 180 days after a prior case was
(1) dismissed for willful failure to abide by court orders, or (2) voluntarily
dismissed at the request of the debtor after the filing of a request for relief
from the automatic stay. This approach defines the kind of cases of recurrent
filing that are most likely to constitute the abusive use of bankruptcy to
frustrate efforts at foreclosure. 99 This is especially likely in the context of a
96. See In re Gates, 42 Bankr. 4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(1)(3) (1982); In re Bolton, 43 Bankr. 48 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re
Gates, 42 Bankr. 4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) (no confirmation third plan); In re Nimmo, 39 Bankr. 5
(Bankr. D. N.M. 1984); In re Artishon, 39 Bankr. 890 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Marit-Trigona, 35
Bankr. 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Steele v. Mortgage Corp. of the South, 34 Bankr. 172 (Bankr.
M.D. Ala. 1983).
98. See Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. 708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983) (second filing not
bad faith); In re Bolton, 43 Bankr. 48, 51-52 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (changed circumstances not
proven); In re Smith, 43 Bankr. 319, 321-22 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1984) (fourth plan confirmed owing to
changed circumstances).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 109(f) (Supp. III 1985). See In re Patel, 48 Bankr. 418 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1985).
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voluntary dismissal following a motion for relief from the stay. In
circumstances not expressly covered by the exclusionary standards,
preexisting case law continues to apply.
VI
CONCLUSION

This article describes several themes that define a concept of consumer
abuse of bankruptcy and correlatively suggest an acceptable role for
bankruptcy in the consumer credit context. In this connection, the article
discusses when and how a consumer debtor appropriately can rely on
bankruptcy as an alternative to performing a credit contract, which entails the
examination of various assumptions about the performance of such contracts
and their underlying and often controversial policy predicates.
The developing law in this area mediates among competing policies that
reflect diametric conceptions of the desired use, availability, and planning of
bankruptcy by consumer debtors. It defines acceptable debtor behavior in
equitable terms and provides sanctions designed to avert egregious debtor
overreaching and fraud. In thus excluding from bankruptcy only those
extreme cases about which some consensus can be established, the law of
abuse properly leaves the primary decision largely in the hands of the debtor.
Under current law, an individual debtor's access to bankruptcy turns on
equitable considerations rather than on absolute right. The standards of
substantial abuse in chapter 7 and good faith or cause in chapter 13 reflect
this position. The preeminent equitable consideration links the debtor's right
to bankruptcy relief to some actual need for the remedy. Need is defined
loosely but is a function not only of the debtor's assets, but also of the
relationship between his expected future income and his existing debt and
expected future expenses. The disposable future income standard appliesalbeit differently-in both chapter 13 and chapter 7. Chapter 13 cannot be
used for income shifting so as to block the access of an existing creditor to this
future asset. Chapter 7, on the other hand, permits income shifting, but
sanctions dismissal of the debtor's petition in extreme cases of attempted
protection of substantial future income.
A need standard is consonant with the policy assumption that a debtor
should elect bankruptcy for reasons consistent with the ultimate character of
the remedy-granting a discharge to a debtor who has complied with the
requirements for submission of data, income, and assets. Abuse law does not
justify broad speculation about the motives of the debtor. Nevertheless,
extreme cases of multiple filing and voluntary dismissal, unjustified delay, and
comprehensive failure to conform with reporting requirements constitute
abuse.
The standards refer to extreme cases, and abuse law deals with the degree
and substantiality of effect of the debtor's conduct. This line-drawing is
inherently and ultimately uncertain. It occurs under standards of substantial
abuse in chapter 7, in distinguishing permitted from fraudulent conversion of
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assets, and in defining bad faith or cause. In these and other settings, the
debtor retains substantial discretion, but creditor interests supply a growing
counterweight as that discretion is exploited to the substantial, avoidable, and
unnecessary detriment of creditors. The line between a legal right to exercise
choices for personal benefit and the equitable restraints on that right is not
clear, nor can it ever become so. Nevertheless, the line is recurrently and
necessarily drawn either by explicit decision or by de facto acceptance of
conduct that pushes at appropriate limits.
Much of the law of abuse is couched in language of fraud,
misrepresentation, and concealment. This language identifies various
transactions through which the debtor seeks unmerited advantage by
manipulating or misrepresenting information, creating fictitious transfers,

and failing to disclose or report. Abuse in the form of fraud may entail
conveyances from the debtor to third parties or acquisitions of property by
the debtor through misrepresentation of status or current intent. In each
case, the doctrinal guide couples intent to harm creditors with nondisclosure
or misrepresentation of pertinent facts. This coupling must be distinguished
from acceptable intentions to obtain personal benefit. Once again, the
standards define the bounds of accepted fair dealing and provide sanctions
against extreme deviations.
This article describes an initial framework that defines the law of abuse
and its role in structuring the application of bankruptcy in the consumer
credit area. The restraints imposed by abuse standards largely affect only the
periphery and permit debtors substantial latitude. This flexibility is proper,
but there are increasingly urgent needs to develop more coherent
conceptions of both overall bankruptcy policy and the role of bankruptcy in
the context of current consumer credit transactions.

